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WHAT THE NATURE OF THE PEACE WILL BE

BY YVES GUYOT
FORMERLY FRENCH MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS

THE surgeons and nurses at the magnificent and comfortable American Ambulance at Neuilly, near Paris, have certainly, while chatting with the wounded French soldiers, been struck by the fact that war has not developed in them a warlike spirit. They say very little, and what they do say is said with modesty, about the battles in which they have taken part and the dangers which they have affronted. They rather talk a great deal about their families, their every-day occupations, about trade, and, if they are farmers, about the crops. But whatever may be the trials and dangers to which they may yet be exposed in returning to the front, not one of them asks for an immediate peace. They are fighting against their will, but their resignation is not passive; on the contrary, it is very resolute. Here is what they say or think: "The Kaiser wants war. All right; so much the worse for him. The struggle shall last until he is rendered powerless. We must not conclude a peace which would be a mere interlude. We cannot go on waking up every morning to ask ourselves if we are to have a war on the morrow. Since 1870 we have dwelt under a perpetual threat. Damocles' sword was typified in the eyes of every European by that of William II. At every moment he threatened to let it fall. His speeches and the Crown Prince's threats were sure to be hard facts some day. The resultant anxiety has paralyzed every energy and every initiative of the French nation. It increased the military expenses, it brought back three years' service when we had got it down to two, it increased our taxes and augmented our public debt. "Now that we are in the furnace we must fight on until nothing remains of this awful nightmare." This is the way the Neuilly soldiers talk, and their words are echoed by the whole of France. Their opinions are also shared by all the Allies.

The problem to be solved, therefore, is what the conditions

of this peace shall be; and right at the start looms up the question whether the all-powerful Kaiser will come down from his heights and consent to make peace. But to my way of thinking, the personality of the Kaiser need not be taken into consideration. The all-important thing is to destroy the Austro-German armies. Once they are crushed, Germany will be forced to surrender unconditionally, as Austria did after Austerlitz, and Prussia after Jena. If the Franco-British-Belgian armies force back across the frontiers, as they are slowly but successfully doing, an enemy of exhausted men and horses, an army disheartened by defeat, then the Allies may easily take the classic road of the Main which will lead them to the battle-fields of Jena and Lutzen and render them masters of Halle, the center of the German railway system. If the Russian armies, leaving a part of the German forces sunk in the mud-fields of Poland and East Prussia, and having crushed the remainder, pass along the left bank of the Oder above Breslau, they will be only some one hundred and forty miles from Dresden; and when the armies of the West and the East shall join forces on the celebrated battle-field of Leipsic, the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns will have lived. If, a fortnight later, they make a triumphal entrance into Berlin this will be only a formality intended to impress on every German the certainty of the breakdown of their once-famous Kaiser's pretentious policy. It should be remembered that when the Allies entered Paris in 1814 they did not treat with Napoleon, who had abdicated at Fontainebleau; and when the Congress of Vienna learned of Napoleon's landing at Frejus in March, 1815, it declared him "the enemy of the public peace" and placed him "under the ban of nations." On March 25 the allied monarchs—the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia—received at their headquarters in Haguenau a deputation of the French Chambers, headed by Lafayette, who were informed that the peace would not be discussed until Napoleon was handed over to the Allies.

The Allies of to-day may not be so exacting as those of just a hundred years ago. But that they will refuse to treat with the Kaiser, is certain. Should he abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince, the latter, in view of his conduct in the past, his acts in France and Belgium during the present campaign, and his well-known ideas, would be even more disqualified than his father. But who, then, would be qualified to treat with the victorious nations?

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According to the constitution of 1871 the German Empire is represented by the Bundesrath, or Federal Council, made up of delegates from each State of the federation, plenipotentiaries nominated by the heads of these States. They number 61 in all: 17 representing Prussia; 6, Bavaria; 4, Saxony; 4, Würtemberg; 3, the Grand Duchy of Baden; 3, Alsace-Lorraine; 3, Hesse; 2, Mecklenburg-Schwerin; 2, the Duchy of Brunswick; and 1 for each of the other States and free cities. Here is an excellent body with whom the Allies can treat. And what will the Allies and this Council be called upon to settle? Two all-important points: 1, Deprive Prussia of her political hegemony in Germany; and, 2, Establish an European equilibrium which will make impossible its disturbance by the will of a chief of State.

THE PRINCIPALS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE PEACE

Who, on the side of the victors, will settle the peace? Persons pervaded by more kind-heartedness than wisdom talk of a Congress of Neutral Powers. With the exception of the United States, the other neutral Powers are, in Europe, small countries, with one or two exceptions. If the United States were invited to participate, then Brazil and the Argentine Republic at least would also be invited among the South American nations. I know the rule that no one can be at the same time both judge and party to the suit. The belligerents must not alone have the settling of the dispute. But the armed settlement of conflicts shows that it has been so far impossible to accomplish these ends by pacific means. The belligerents know what this war has cost them, and the highest interests of the Allies demand that their aggressors shall be placed in such a position that a like catastrophe cannot happen again. But suppose the neutral Powers were to try and arrange matters and one of the belligerents should refuse to submit to the decisions of these Powers, what coercive measures could be employed? No, the question will be settled directly between the Allies—Great Britain, Russia, and France—on the one hand, representing Belgium, Servia, Japan, Portugal, and Montenegro, with Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other.

In 1814 Vienna was filled with sovereigns, little German princes, and representatives of all the European Powers. But, by virtue of the Quadruple Alliance concluded at Chaumont, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain settled everything

between themselves. The secret part of the Treaty of Paris read: "The relations which are to determine a true and lasting balance of power throughout Europe will be set forth at the Congress on a basis established by the Allied Powers in agreement." Thus the four great Powers had determined to keep within their own exclusive hands the arrangement of the whole matter, and if France was finally admitted to their counsels, this was due to the authority exercised by Talleyrand and to his cleverness, as well as to the rival interests of the four sovereigns who often found it difficult to work together. And once safely seated in the Congress, Talleyrand's influence was felt. He said: "The thing needed by Europe is that once and forever be banished the opinion that rights may be acquired by mere conquest; the principle of legitimacy must be reawakened. I put equity first and mere longings afterward." He insisted that the protocol should contain these words: "The settlements shall be in accordance with public equity." And when von Hardenberg and von Humboldt, representing Prussia, replied, rather angrily, "What has public equity to do here?" Talleyrand answered, quietly, "It accounts for your being here!" Nor did Prussia in after years act on the principles laid down by the famous French diplomat. In the affair of the Danish Duchies, in the declaration of war against Austria in 1866, in the war of 1870-71 with France, in the recent ultimatum sent by Austria to Serbia, in Germany's declaration of war last August against France, in the violation of the neutrality of Belgium which followed, the governing idea of Prussia is expressed by Bismarck's phrase, "iron and blood."

To this policy—a direct inheritance of the despoiling ways of the Germans of Tacitus—Great Britain, France, and Russia must now oppose a humane policy which will respect all rights, which will consider all the aspirations of the different nations in so far as they do not endanger the realization of the work in hand as a whole, and which, by the suppression of the greatest number possible of oppressors, will insure the safety of all. In a word, the principle which must guide the Allies must be that of the guaranteeing of peace. Again, from a psychological point of view, every act of a humiliating nature must be avoided. Insults weigh lightly on those who commit them, but they leave a lasting mark on the minds of those who are forced to submit to them.

Of course the question of war indemnities will be brought up. In 1815 Prussia required from France the payment of \$140,000,-

000, and in 1870 Germany took \$1,000,000,000. It has been stated on more or less good authority that if Germany is successful in the present war France will be forced to pay \$6,000,000,000. None of the Allies considers war a means of making money. Great Britain long ago learned that war is a business that does not pay. The Allies will simply estimate their outlay caused by the war, and the loss occasioned by the destruction of property, and then call upon Germany and Austria to foot the bill. They will have to pay principal and interest. Of course the longer the war lasts, the heavier the costs will be. All this will be but in accordance with Article III of the Convention of 1907 of The Hague, as proposed by the German delegation, which runs as follows: "The belligerent who shall violate the dispositions of this regulation shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity and shall be held responsible for all acts committed by persons belonging to his armed forces." The violation of Belgian neutrality will especially have to be paid for and at a heavy rate; for, however high this rate may be, it can never repay all the losses caused by the armed forces of Germany. It cannot bring back to life or compensate for the massacre of the children, women, and aged men who should not have suffered, nor can it restore the ruins of Louvain or the cathedral of Rheims.

The Allies will also have to examine whether the heads of State, the commanders of army corps, those officers who have ordered and those soldiers who have been guilty of the murder of aged people, women, children, and unarmed men, who have committed acts of barbarity and destruction, who have indulged in plunder, shall not be brought before a tribunal established at The Hague and be dealt with as common law criminals.

Germany has more than 65,000,000 inhabitants, whose private fortunes are estimated at from 80 to 90 billions of dollars. The interest on her public debt is only \$70,000,000. So she can easily support an indemnity of from 4 to 6 billions of dollars. As regards Austria-Hungary, she is less wealthy; nor must all her people be subjected to an indemnity. But the belligerents will have the right to claim damages, the larger portion of which will be handed over to Servia and Montenegro.

But in claiming reparation of a pecuniary nature from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Allies will not be actuated by a desire to ruin those countries. They well know that the poverty of one nation does not make for the wealth of another. They will not fill up the ports of Hamburg and Bremen; they

will not seek to bar the navigation of the Rhine; they will not close the mines of Westphalia nor restrain Germans from manufacturing chemicals and electric apparatus if they can find purchasers therefor. The foreign markets of Germany will not be closed by the acts of the Allies, but by the distrust caused by the methods of espionage of which the Germans have been guilty in the past.

The second ruling principle which must guide the Allies in their negotiations will be to seek to remove the causes of future wars. In 1648 the treaty of Westphalia eliminated religious differences as a ground of international conflicts, and thereby rendered an enormous service to the cause of peace. We must accomplish a similar good work. Dynastic reasons for discord are disappearing, though it will be remembered that the pretext for the outbreak of 1870 was the candidature of a Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain. The dynasty question will now come forward only in connection with the exclusion of the Hohenzollerns from the throne of Prussia, which must be a *sine quâ non* of the future peace.

The negotiators of the Congress of Vienna pretended that they were trying to establish a European balance. But the Prussian Friedrich von Gentz, secretary of the Congress, said in a report dated February 12, 1815:

The fine words concerning the regeneration of the political system of Europe and a lasting peace based on an equitable partition of forces, etc., are spoken with the aim of quieting the public mind and giving an air of dignity and grandeur to the meeting. But the true object which the Congress had in view was the apportionment among the victors of the booty taken from the vanquished!

But the Allies of 1915 will not wish to enrich themselves at the expense of Germany or Austria-Hungary. Belgium will not ask for an increased territory; the annexation of Rhenish Prussia, with its more than 7,000,000 inhabitants, almost equal in numbers to the population of Belgium itself, would simply crush the nationality of the latter country. France will only take back Alsace-Lorraine, which was wrested from her in 1870 and which Germany admits, by the way she treats these provinces, have not been assimilated by the Empire. The little strip of territory surrounding Saarbrücken and Saarlouis, which was to have been left to France in 1815, but was handed over to Prussia by the final arrangement, may be added to the two provinces. If the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria are to return to Poland, it will not be to Russia. The Ruthenians

of that portion of Galicia situated beyond the river Save, oppressed by the Polish of Galicia and by the Government of Vienna, may ask to join their compatriots, the Little Russians of Russia. As regards the German colonies, their value is insignificant. Their white population consists of but 27,812, and their black population of 11,974,500; their area is under two million square miles, and their trade with Germany amounts to less than \$40,000,000. If the Allies take them it will not be for love of lucre, but to remove grounds for future conflict, for it should be remembered that at the opening of the war the Kaiser stated that colonial considerations was one of its causes. This cause must disappear. Serbia and Montenegro must alone among the belligerents receive an increase of territory. 7

Such was the situation up to the moment of the entering on the scene of Turkey. But the territorial plan of settlement must now be modified in favor of Russia. It should be remembered that Constantinople is not a Turkish city, but an international one, where Greeks, Armenians, and people of every race bustle about, forming intrigues of every kind. Could a condominium of Great Britain, France, and Russia take over the power there and enforce the freedom of the Straits? Experience proves that the exercise of a condominium is difficult and its duration precarious. The Allies will probably conclude that the best solution will be the handing over to Russia of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Bulgaria, in compensation for the development of Serbia, may get back a portion of the territory of Turkey which she had to abandon after the last war, and may receive in addition a portion of Macedonia. Or some such arrangement as this may be made: All that portion of Turkey bordering the Black Sea may be given to Russia; Mesopotamia, and the regions of the Euphrates and the Tigrus, to Great Britain; and Syria and a part of the Mediterranean shores to France.

A word more about the minor Allies. Austria-Hungary has always wished to prevent Serbia from having access to the Adriatic. But such access will certainly result from the present war. It may be effected by the railroad from the Danube to the Adriatic, which has long been planned and which, passing by Montenegro, will have as its terminus Antivari, Montenegro's only seaport.

The Montenegro question is intimately bound up with that of Albania, which bristles with difficulties. This handful of Albanians—they number but 800,000—might be left out of

consideration if they were not a continual cause of discord, particularly in the Balkans, due largely to the fact that they are worked upon by three influences—that of Turkey, that of Austria, and that of Italy. If the Allies decide that the autonomy of Albania is to be maintained, the new State must be kept within the strictest limits.

Portugal declared war not because she intended to invade Germany with her little army, but in order to prevent the enemies' shipping from seeking refuge at the mouth of the Tagus or from setting up a wireless telegraphic station on the Portuguese coasts. Though Portugal is already a very large colonial Power, coming directly after Great Britain, France, and Germany as regards the square miles of her possessions, she cannot expect an enlargement of her domains in exchange for her co-operation. The fact is that she would derive a more substantial benefit if she were to seize the opportunity of the general liquidation at the close of the war to dispose of her colonies to one of the Allies for a good price.

Japan has shown great cleverness by openly siding with the Allies at the very start without waiting, to use a vulgar but very apt expression, to see which way the cat is going to jump. At the same time she has satisfied an old grudge by taking from the German Empire Kiao-Chau, thus ending the German dream of the morselization of China. When she entered upon the scene, Japan gave the United States the most formal assurance that she had no intention of troubling the islands of the Pacific, and I trust she will observe the same wise demeanor in regard to Kiao-Chau, so that the question of its retrocession to China will not have to be brought up before the Allies at the close of hostilities.

The disinterestedness of Great Britain, France, and Russia is a guarantee of their agreement when the time comes for them to settle the world-wide matters awakened by the aggressions of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The three Powers have gone to war to obtain a lasting peace for themselves, and for Europe likewise. But it is an illusion to believe that such a peace can be obtained simply by dismantling fortresses and limiting the armaments of the conquered nations. After Jena, Napoleon employed these means with Prussia: he reduced her army to 42,000 men. But this reduction fired Stein with the idea of organizing the *Landwehr*, whence sprang that instrument of war which enabled Prussia to defeat France in 1870. After Wagram, Napoleon also restricted the Austrian army to 150,000

men. But the suppression of this clause in the treaty was one of the conditions of his marriage with Maria Louisa. Such limitations imply, on the part of the Government which exercises them, a right of supervision incompatible with the independence of the nation subjected thereto. They who would base peace on restriction of armaments confuse effect and cause. It is the causes of war which must be done away with.

Nor is it certain that an imposed change in the form of government of the conquered nations will be any more efficacious in securing a permanent peace than forced disarmament. In January, 1814, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England decided what régime should be set up in France on the ruins of the Empire, and we know what the result was. We French have learned from our experience in 1848, which cost France so dear, that replacing a king by a president does not transform a monarchical nation into a republic. Though the republican form of government is a better guarantee of peace than the autocratic one, it is not free from defects which may provoke a conflict. But in the present instance the Allies are not to be called upon to interfere in the form of government of Germany and Austria, though neither of these countries can remain constituted as it is at present. But the alterations to which these Powers will be subjected will not be inspired by the desire on the part of the Allied Governments to interfere with the home policy of the two conquered nations. The Allies will have but one end in view—*viz.*, to render impossible the breaking out of a new war within a few years.

When, at the Congress of Vienna, Talleyrand advocated the principle of monarchical legitimacy, he spoke to men who considered only the interests of sovereigns and princes who were looked upon as the owners of the people. But to-day the rôles are reversed. Political decisions are based on the interests of the people. But right here comes in an ethnological complication. Thus, the Germans have tried to justify their conquests of 1870 on politico-anthropological grounds; and declare that they annexed Alsace because the population was of German origin. The same claim did not hold true for Lorraine, which did not prevent them from annexing a portion of that province just as in the previous century they participated in the partition of Poland. The learned professors across the Rhine have a great deal to say about a "Teutonic type." In this connection one should read the book of Prof. William Z. Ripley, of Harvard, entitled *The Races of Europe*, where it will be learned that

somatic characteristics are very variable among people who claim to belong to the same race. Linguistic considerations, legends, and historical souvenirs are better criteria, and must be taken into account, for languages and traditions have formed solid groups of men. Yet the "principle of nationalities," which played so baleful a part in European politics during the second half of the nineteenth century, is not based on law, but on traditionalism, and is opposed to the views proclaimed by the philosophers of the French school of the eighteenth century. In determining the fate of Germany and Austria the Allies must take this point of view.

To sum up, the peace treaty which will end the present war will be imposed on Germany and Austria by the three Allied Powers—Great Britain, Russia, and France—who will be actuated by the following principles: 1. A war indemnity which will represent the damages caused by the war. 2. As regards territorial acquisitions, the Allies will show disinterestedness. 3. All other considerations will be subordinated to this one—*viz.*, the elimination of the causes of future warfare. 4. This will be the sole object in view in the reorganization of Germany and Austria-Hungary. 5. In bringing about this reorganization the Allies will take account of the groups called "nationalities," but without giving them the fictitious importance attributed to them by political anthropology.

THE REORGANIZATION OF GERMANY

Referring to his act of so modifying the famous Ems telegram in the summer of 1870 as to precipitate a war with France, Bismarck once said: "I was convinced that the abyss which had been formed in the course of history between the north and the south of the Fatherland by divergences of sentiment, race, and dynasties could be filled up only by means of a national war against our French neighbor." The Iron Chancellor attained his object and the German Empire was declared at Versailles.

In international matters the power of the German Emperor is absolute. For instance, when he convened the Bundesrath just before the outbreak of the present war the aggression against Servia, which he and the Austrian Government had prepared, was already under way. The Emperor-King is the head of the army, and the Prussian military system extends throughout the whole Empire. As a matter of fact the kings and grand dukes who form part of the German Empire are

really the subjects of the King of Prussia. Indeed, William II. has never missed an opportunity of asserting his absolute power. "*Suprema lex Regis voluntas*," he wrote in the Golden Book of the Munich municipality. "I am the sole master in the Empire and I will tolerate no other," he said before the Chamber of the Rhenish Province. "There is but one law, and that is my law," he declared to the recruits in 1893; and he wrote beneath his portrait which he presented to the Minister of Public Worship in Berlin, "*Sic volo, sic jubeo*." The rest of this verse of Juvenal—"sit pro ratione voluntas" ("my will is my reason")—was not expressed, but was understood. The Allies must destroy this military absolutism; they must deprive Prussia of the political hegemony of Germany.

The Confederation of the Rhine might be re-established with Bavaria as its center, which is connected by the Bavarian Palatinate with the Rhenish Province and Westphalia. The majority of the inhabitants of these States are Catholic. To Saxony might be given back the parts of her territory taken from her by Prussia in 1865 and 1866, while Denmark would recover the Schleswig-Holstein Duchies of which she was robbed in 1864, and the Kiel Canal would be neutralized like the Suez Canal. In a word, the problem which arises may have one of two solutions: Will the coming defeat be the cause of the breaking up of the German Empire or will it increase the solidarity of States which Bismarck, by victory, established through bloodshed? There can be no doubt that the kings, princes, and peoples of the Fatherland have been Prussianized; they have been proud to fill other nations with fear; they have all been on a pilgrimage to Germania. This compensation has led the vanquished of 1866 to take their defeat for a victory. The King of Bavaria may even have forgotten that his lameness is due to a Prussian bullet. Or, on the other hand, may they conclude that Greater Germany has not given them the security they expected therefrom? They know, as I have already said, that the Kaiser precipitated all Germany into the war without consulting the Kings and States composing the Bundesrath, and that his braggart policy, of which they were very proud while digesting their beer, has passed from the realm of words into that of deeds. They have seen that the "irresistible army" with its "infallible strategists" has hurled itself on a pygmy like Belgium, and that the pygmy resisted in a way worthy of its audacity; that those Frenchmen, "so flippant and improvident," so crushed, as they supposed, in 1870, have not been trodden

under by the weight of the German mass; that the valiant Crown Prince, instead of entering Paris, was obliged in one night to draw back some twenty-five miles; and that the famous German staff, instead of obtaining another Sedan, now sees disaster staring it in the face on both the eastern and the western line of battle. In a word, they perceive that glory and security have disappeared and that the constitution of 1871 is breaking up in the midst of the greatest downfall which Germany has ever experienced. So we may well ask whether German particularism will ever reappear and whether the various German peoples may not declare, We are no longer Prussians and will become once more Saxons, Bavarians, Württembergers, Hanoverians, Badenens, and free Frankforters.

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Professors of constitutional law have asked whether Austria-Hungary is a federative State, a federation of States, a State of States, a kingdom of States, a unified State, or a dual State. This perplexity of the learned specialists well typifies the complexity of the problem that the future congress of the Allies will have to solve as regards the Dual Monarchy. Viewed from the standpoint of languages, the same diversity exists. Thus, in Austria-Hungary are over 12,000,000 souls who speak German and 10,000,000 who speak Hungarian. Then there are 8,500,000 Bohemians, Moravians, and Slovaks, 5,000,000 Poles, 4,000,000 Ruthenians, 5,500,000 Croatians and Servians, 3,000,000 Rumanians, etc., none of which groups, all speaking different tongues, constitutes an independent political body. But from the physical point of view all these various agglomerations appear to be somewhat closely connected while they are separated from one another chiefly by reciprocal hatred; each looks on liberty as the right to dominate the others. At present, after a century-long struggle, the Germans of Austria and the Hungarians have succeeded in dominating all the other nationalities, though, as we have seen by the foregoing figures, the former are in a minority and so have not even the excuse of numbers as a pretext for such domination.

When one hears Hungarians vituperating against Austria one might conclude that they desire separation from the Austrians. But they do not want any such thing; quite the contrary. Budapest knows only too well that, once having broken with Vienna, Hungary would be only a small nation

submerged by the Slavs. They remember that they have given a Prime Minister to the Dual Monarchy, Count Andrassy, who proposed in 1871 the alliance with Germany and who carried the project through in 1879. They know, too, that Hungary owes its preponderance in the Dual Monarchy to the victory of Germany over Austria at Sadowa; they never forget this fact. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked at the future settlement that Count Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary, is more responsible for the present war than is Count Berchtold, till recently Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Allies should see to it that Hungary is not left in a position to do such a thing again.

In 1860 Austria promised autonomy to Bohemia, but forgot all about the promise when, in 1867, the compromise was made and the Dual Monarchy established. It should be remembered that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Bohemia was the center of civilization in Central Europe. But later she was devastated and exhausted by the Thirty Years' War. Again, whereas Hungary never formed a part of the Holy Roman Empire, the King of Bohemia was one of its seven electors. Furthermore, Bohemia has never ceased to struggle against German influence; in spite of all the efforts of Austria to crush the national spirit in Bohemia, the latter has never ceased to assert it, and to-day the Bohemians, the Moravians, and the Slovaks are eager to found an independent State. This wish is sure to appeal to the Allies.

After the settlement of 1867 the Slovaks agitated for the establishment of the kingdom of Slovenia or Illyria, which was to include Trieste, Istria, Gorizia, Gradisca, southern Carinthia, and southern Styria. But now the question of Greater Serbia is to the fore and it may be that the Allies will have to examine the question of a confederation of those different territories. Italy may object to certain parts of this programme, but it should be remembered that, as regards Trieste, for example, though the Italian portion of this region is very active, it is nevertheless but a minority. Indeed, this Slavic problem will not be one of the easiest that the Allies will be called upon to solve. It has always been a source of anxiety to the Dual Monarchy, and this anxiety was not decreased by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which added about 2,000,000 Slavs to those already within the borders of Hungary-Austria. The initial cause, as we all know, of the present conflict was hatred of Serbia and fear of the growth of Pan-Servianism.

But the result will be just the contrary of what was hoped for at Vienna and Budapest.

As for the German provinces of Austria—Lower and Upper Austria, the Duchy of Salzburg, the German Tyrol, and the northern part of Styria—they might be formed into a State of about 10,000,000 inhabitants with Vienna as its capital, or they might be added to Bavaria, as was done by Napoleon at the peace of Pressburg.

Finally, Vorarlberg, a small district of less than 150,000 inhabitants and entirely isolated, might be attached to Switzerland, while the Trentine region, comprising about 700,000 souls, would of course be joined to Italy.

Such are the principal matters concerning the Dual Monarchy that will come before the Allies at the grand settlement, when it will be patent to everybody that Vienna has never managed to assimilate the various nationalities which it has annexed to Austria, and this incapacity is its condemnation. The question will then certainly be asked, Why maintain as a Great Power a State which, having shown its utter administrative and military incompetency within its own borders, has moreover long disturbed the peace of Europe by its ambitions and its hatreds? And the question will be as certainly answered in the negative. Add to this the well-known fact that the majority of the peoples of the Dual Monarchy are themselves calling for its dismemberment, and it will be seen that the line of conduct of the Allies in this part of Europe is already traced for them. And this is the line they will certainly follow.

THE RESURRECTION OF POLAND

Frederick the Great says in his *Memoirs*, "The acquisition of our portion of Poland was one of the most important additions we ever made, for it joined Pomerania to East Prussia and rendered us masters of the Vistula." In 1848 a proposition was brought forward in the Frankfort Diet for the reconstitution of Poland, whereupon Bismarck exclaimed, "It would sever the principal arteries of Prussia." But the Prussians have shown themselves incapable of assimilating the Polish inhabitants subject to their rule, though they have tried all kinds of "colonizing" schemes with this end in view. The result is that whereas the Duchy of Posen numbered, in 1867, 688,000 Germans and 884,000 Poles, in 1910 it numbered 807,000 of the first and 1,279,000 of the second. In Silesia

there are 1,236,000 Poles and 4,774,000 Germans, while in West Prussia the figures are 476,000 Poles and 1,098,000 Germans. The parts containing more Poles than Germans will be incorporated in the New Poland which the Czar by a master stroke has decided to establish and which the Allies can only too willingly approve of. They will remember the speech delivered at Marienburg by the Kaiser in 1900 in the ancient castle of the Knights of the Teutonic Order, when he summoned them to aid him in his crusade against the Poles. They will recognize the fact that Dantzic and the mouth of the Vistula belong to Poland, as well as Galicia, as far as the river San, with its beautiful capital, Cracow. The frontier of the New Poland will be only about ninety-six miles from Berlin, and the King of Prussia, if such a personage exists at the close of the present war, will then be able to visit Königsberg only by sea, unless he crosses Polish territory. In a word, Poland will then form a buffer State between Prussia and Russia, which was in the plan of the Congress of Vienna, but which Prussian avidity prevented from being carried out. Furthermore, this reconstitution of Poland will be the best guarantee that Russia can give the rest of the world that she does not nourish the ambitions of which she is accused in some quarters.

AFTER THE TREATY

It does not follow because a treaty is put on paper and signed that its stipulations will be carried out. This has been seen in the case of the Treaty of Berlin; in 1885 Bulgaria violated it, and in 1911 Austria, without the slightest blush, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order that a treaty have legal force there must be a mandatory whose duty it shall be to see that the stipulations of the treaty be strictly carried out. In 1815, for instance, the Triple Alliance first and the Quadruple Alliance afterward undertook this task, and in the present instance the three Allies will have to enter into a similar agreement and distribute the rôles between them, so that if one of the conquered Powers should try to escape the consequences of its defeat it will immediately find itself in such a position that a single injunction will suffice to obtain strict observance of the treaty.

Such are the outlines of the arrangements which may guarantee a lasting peace to Europe. The setting up of small buffer States will restrict the ambition of the great Powers, and

certain Governments will no longer be able to make France and Russia fill the part of bogey, for the latter will have shown that they are not bent on seizing territory. Prussia's hatred of France came out clearly at the Congress of Vienna, as it has again in the present war. But one does not live on hatred.

The legislative and economic unification of Germany has been accomplished and should not be disturbed, for such an act would affect every one of its inhabitants. If the peace decreases military taxes, lightens service with the colors, removes from every mind the worry of an impending conflict, and leaves men free to devote all their energy to productive occupations, then every German citizen will see that he has profited by the defeat of Prussian militarism and imperialism. He will also perceive that one of the chief causes of this war, an economic cause, has also been removed. I refer to the Kaiser's passion for a monopoly which mixed up industrial policies with military matters, imagining that he could create new markets for German products by the aid of bayonets and cannon. He desired to carry to its extreme limits the assertion that "trade follows the flag."

I may be permitted to add in closing that if our statesmen of to-day were economists they would do away for ever with the causes of economic conflicts by adopting free trade and thus take a definite step toward a lasting world's peace. Unfortunately this will not be accomplished on this occasion. Though the diplomats of Great Britain and Belgium would be capable of understanding such a policy, those of France and Russia will wish to still cling to the practice of "national economics," which Germany has long been teaching in her universities, and whose bitter fruits she is now tasting. But one of my friends, M. Henri Lambert, the large glass manufacturer of Charleroi, without indulging in a word of complaint concerning the evil deeds of the Germans in Belgium, has well said in a recent letter addressed to the President of the United States, "Cobden declared that 'Free trade is the best peacemaker'; and I venture to add that free trade will become more and more the only peacemaker."

YVES GUYOT.